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AN ETHICAL DUTY TO PROTECT ONE'S OWN 
lNFORMA TION PRIVACY? 
Anita L. Allen • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What good might privacy do or represent for us? Philosophers, 
lawyers, political theorists, and policy makers are hard at work seeking to 
understand the value of privacy. They are asking, for example, "whether 
and, if so, why privacy is valuable in a democratic society, and what 
implications privacy has for the ways we see and treat each other."1 As 
summed up by Annabelle Lever: "Proponents of privacy believe that it 
promotes people's freedom, equality, and happiness . . . .  [P]rivacy can 
help to protect people from unjustified scorn, humiliation and 
recrimination, as well as from bribery and coercion . . . . "2 Privacy is 
indeed valuable for democratic societies l ike ours, in which people need the 
capacity to think and act independently? Privacy has value for individuals, 
and in the words of Julie Cohen, "generate[s] large posit ive spillovers for 
society.'"' 
The question I will take up in this lecture is not, however, the famil iar 
one of whether privacy has value-intrinsic or instrumental, personal or 
collective. Instead, it is a broad question about the ascription of ethical 
responsibility: in addition to any moral obligation to protect others' 
* Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D, Henry R Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Professor Allen is a member of the Presidential Commission 
for the Study of Bioethicallssues, appointed by President Barack Obama in April2 01 0. I would like to 
thank the University of Alabama community for inviting me to deliver this Meador Lecture in Morality 
in the fall of 2 012 . I would like to thank faculty and students affiliated with the Tel Aviv University 
Law School, the Princeton University Center for Values, and the University of Pennsylvania Annenberg 
School for insightful comments and criticisms on the ideas set forth in this lc�lun:. 
I. ANNABELLE LEVER, ON PRIVACY I ( 20 12 )  ( discussing the secret ballot, sexual orientation 
outing, sex reproduction and family life, and property values as they relate to notions and ideals of 
privacy). 
2 .  !d. at 85.  
3. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 2 1-22 (201 ) [hereinafter 
ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY); ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN'T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST 
REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-7 (2003). 
4. Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Citizen, in IMAGINING NEW LEGALITIES: PRJVACY 
AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 1 29, 144 ( Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2 012). 
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i nformation privacy,5 do i ndividuals also have a moral obligation to protect 
their own i nformation privacy? Moreover, could protecting o ne's own 
information privacy be called for by important moral virtues, as well as 
obligations or duties?6 I broached the issue of protecting one's own privacy 
as a requirement of ethics in a recent book about physical and information 
privacies.7 But limited space and a broad, ambitious agenda prevented me 
from fully examining the case for and against the ascription of ethical 
duties to protect one's own privacy to individuals, So, I return to it here. 
Safeguarding others' privacy is widely u nderstood to be a 
responsibil ity of government, business, and individuals. The "virtue" of 
fairness and the "duty" or  "obl igation" of respect for persons arguably 
ground other-regarding responsibilities of confidential ity and data security. 
But is anyone ethically required-not just prudentially advised-to protect 
his or her own privacy? If so, how might a requirement to protect o ne's 
own privacy and related e thical virtues properly influence everyday 
choices, public policy, or the law?8 I want to test the idea of an ethical 
mandate to protect one's own privacy, while identifying the practical and 
philosophical problems that bear adversely on the case. 
II. THE GREAT INFORMATION PRIVACY GIVE-AWAY 
W ith respect to informatio n privacy, the question of a duty to protect 
one's own privacy is an especially timely and important one. I focus on 
information privacy-as opposed to decisional or physical privacy-for 
that reason.9 We are in the midst of an Era of Revelation. 10 Our time is 
5. C f  Anita L .  Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to  Privacy Tort, 81  FORDHAM L .  REV. 
1187 (2012) (noting the common law obligation to protect privacy based on respect for others' 
freedom). 
6. In asking this question, I mean to use the paired terms "duty" and "obligation" synonymously 
and also the terms "moral" and "ethical" synonymously as academic philosophers often do. Yet, "duty" 
and "ethical" sometimes connote specific social roles. And "ethical" is sometimes understood to 
designate a more cosmopolitan system of norms than "moral." Questions of ethical duty differ in key 
respects from questions of ethical moral virtue. The former center around concerns of conduct, the latter 
concerns of character. 
7. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY, supra note 3, at 195-97. 
8. Cf JEAN COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2004) (illustrating that 
the military's "don't ask, don't tell" rules made a duty of privacy by forcing homosexuals to conceal 
facts revealing their sexuai orientations). It would not follow from the ascription of self-regarding 
information privacy obligations that the information people are obliged to keep quiet is all and only the 
information that makes other people uncomfortable and whose suppression reinforces prejudice and 
inequality. 
9. ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 4-6 (2d ed. 2011) (distinguishing informational 
from physical and decisional uses of"privacy" in the law). 
10. Anita L. Allen, What Must We Hide: The Ethics of Privacy and the Ethos of Disclosure, 25 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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characterized by what I term the "Great Privacy Give-Away."11 People are 
giving away more and more personal data to intimates and strangers for a 
variety of self-interested, altruistic, or civic-minded reasons. 
Some scholars and other commentators have expressed admiration and 
support for individuals who choose freely to share personal information, 
and some have concluded that it is good for society that individuals are 
choosing to share personal data.12 Indeed, there can be good reasons to 
share, even what is deemed highly sensitive personal data, as a recent 
report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
found with respect to individuals' sensitive whole genome sequencing data 
sought by biomedical researchers.13 
In the U.S.  and most other parts of the world, contemporary modes of 
communication feature extensive, high-technology-aided personal­
information sharing that is enjoyable, rewarding, often practically 
necessary, and publicly beneficial. The benefits of information disclosure 
are sufficiently numerous, in fact, that it may strike some as facially 
implausible that there could be any such thing as an ethical obligation not 
to disclose. How could we be duty-bound to withhold information about 
ourselves? 
Of course, we all recognize special professional duties of 
confidentiality and secrecy, which are specific modes of legally and 
ethically mandated information privacy. Thus, in the usual case, a federal 
government employee cannot ethically reveal classified information 
without authorization. 14 A lawyer cannot ethically share many of the 
secrets she discusses with her clients in the course of representation.1 5  But 
II. See ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY, supra note 3, at 156, 162. I also refer to a privacy "take 
away." 
12. Cf Eric Posner, Liberalism and Concealment, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/unpopular-privacy-anita-allen ("If this is so, Allen's prescription is 
exactly backward: we should insist on unpopular publicity, and mandate transparency, not privacy. In 
the meantime, we should praise rather than condemn those young people who lead the way by 
insouciantly uploading their private lives to the web."). For the record, I believe Professor Posner's 
review badly misfires. Others have found more to praise. See, e.g., Judith Wagner DeCew, Unpopular 
Privacy: What Must We Hide?, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REvs. (June 31, 2012) (book review), 
http:i/ndpr.nd.edu/news/31588-unpopular-privacy-what-must-we-hide/. 
13. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE S TUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRJVACY AND PROGRESS IN 
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING (20 12), www.bioethics.gov/cms/sites/defauhlfiles/PrivacyProgress508 _ 
1.pdf. 
14. For example, Bradley E. Manning is a U.S. soldier in his twenties currently awaiting trial to 
determine whether he violated federal law when, while stationed in Iraq and without authorization, he 
turned over volumes of diplomatic cables to Wikileaks, which then released them to the general public. 
Archive of Articles on Bradley Manning, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/people/mlbradley _ e _ manning/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 20 13). 
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) ("Confidentiality Of Information. (a) A 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). (b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
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in the Era of Revelation, I surmise many would argue that there is no moral 
or ethical basis for disapproving if a government employee, a lawyer, or 
anyone else freely chooses to share intimacies about her own life .  On this 
perspective, without any moral or ethical shadow, a person can always 
reveal that she practices celibacy, has breast cancer, is burdened by a pile 
of unpaid debts, or dislikes foreigners. Only norms of tact, manners, and 
taste apply. (A philosopher might argue, building on Helen Nissenbaum's  
powerful descriptive account of  information privacy, that there are ethical 
norms of appropriateness, not mere guidelines of taste and tact at stake 
here.16) 
A new, technophilic generation appears to have made disclosure the 
default rule of everyday l ife, and it cannot imagine things any other way. 
Commentators excitedly claim that a new generation has rejected or 
redefined informational privacy .17 Some older people welcome the change. 
"Let us celebrate the insouciance of youthful privacy indifference!" one of 
my grey-haired legal colleagues asserts, ironically repeating market­
economy efficiency arguments for transparency articulated more than fifty 
years ago, pre-Internet.18 The young and young at heart may indeed look 
back and snicker at the high-toned insistence of Judge Richard Posner in 
Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 19 that the mysteries of privacy universally 
extend to graphic details of the intimacies of the bedroom and toilet. 20 "Big 
Brother"-not the Orwell character but the European and American reality 
TV show that places young adults on public display nearly 24/7- i s  
1 d 
. 21 a rea y vmtage. 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary .... (c) A lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access 
to, information relating to the representation of a client."). 
1 6. Cf Tony Doyle, Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity 
of Social Life, 45 J. VALUE INQUIRY 97, 99-100 (2010) (book review) (discussing that norms of 
appropriateness are constitutive of privacy). 
17. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social 
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 73 (2007). 
18. Eric Posner, supra note 12 (making (without express attribution) arguments made by Richard 
Posner in his early work on privacy). 
19. 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Even people who have nothing rationally to be ashamed 
of can be mortified by the publication of intimate details of their life. Most people in no wise deformed 
or disfigured would nevertheless be deeply upset if nude photographs of themselves were published in a 
newspaper or a book. They feel the same way about photographs of their sexual activities, however 
'normal,' or about a narrative of those activities, or about having their medical records publicized. 
Although it is well known that every human being defecates, no adult human being in our society wants 
a newspaper to show a picture of him defecating. The desire for privacy illustrated by these examples is 
a mysterious but deep fact about human personality. It deserves and in our society receives legal 
protection."). 
20. /d. 
21. Big Brother, l MDB.COM, http://www .imdb.com/title/tt0251497 I (last visited Mar. 13, 20 13). 
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Yet, if we are to take normative ethics seriously-and I recognize that 
not everyone wants to or can-we have to be open to the possibility that 
some of what we do and enjoy doing may not be ethically good or best. We 
may have ethical reasons and obligations to do things differently. The fact 
that a new generation has rewritten the rules of privacy or abandoned 
privacy as a value altogether would not prove that privacy was or is mostly 
worthless. Admittedly, values do erode; values can outlive their times.22 In 
my lifetime, it was widely considered immoral-and illegal-for 
unmarried people and people of different races to cohabitate.23 
It is not especially problematic to say, with ethics in mind, that 
someone has an obligation to protect other people's privacy. That we can 
understand and agree with. We have no problem saying that people have a 
moral obligation not to make gratuitous, cruel, unconsented-to information 
disclosures about others. In 20 I 0, Rutgers University student Dharun Ravi 
violated that ethical duty with horrendous consequences. He surreptitiously 
webcast his roommate Tyler Clementi being intimate with another man, 
which prompted a mortified Clementi to commit suicide. More than an 
excusable prank, it is plain wrong to secretly broadcast someone's date 
with a consenting adult in his own home. 
Now, as to duties to protect your own privacy, can we sensibly ascribe 
these? With prudence in mind, it is fairly common to ascribe obligations of 
self-care relating to informational privacy and data protection. To protect 
my reputation and feelings there are certain practical precautions I should 
take. Prudent self-interest demands that I password-protect electronic 
access to my banking accounts at Wells Fargo. If I download my medical 
records from myuniversitymedicine.com, I should use the password-protect 
option. I should periodically change my university.edu e-mail password. I 
should think hard about what I put into Dropbox,24 about what I reveal 
about my location via Foursquare,25 and about the content of my Tumblr6 
postings. But are self-regarding moral duties, as well as self-interested 
practical strategies, implicated in online life? 
Sometimes people are so inattentive to their privacy that moral and 
ethical values do appear to come into play. Recall former Congressman 
Anthony Weiner, a Democratic member of the United States House of 
22. Cf Kathryn Abrams, Disenchanting the Public/Private Distinction, in IMAGINING NEW 
LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25, 25-26 {Austin Sarat et al.  eds., 
20 1 1 ) (advocating a less "enchanted" view of privacy that acknowledges the nonnative tensions of 
valuing the public and valuing the private). 
23. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 2 ( 1 967). 
24. DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Mar. 1 3, 20 1 3). 
25. FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/ (last visited Mar. 1 3, 201 3). 
26. TuMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/ (last visited Mar. 1 3, 201 3). 
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Representatives from New York. 27 Congressman Weiner sent sexually 
suggestive images of his pelvic region clad in tight-fitting underwear that 
revealed the outlines of his penis. He sent the images in Twitter messages 
to young women, ages 21 and 17, whom he d id not know .28 As a 
consequence of this reckless behavior, Weiner was forced to resign from 
office in 201 1 .  Weiner disrespected himself, displ aying l ittle regard for the 
privacy of his body and sexu al urges. 29 The Weiner case shines a l ight on 
the specific question I want to explore i n  this lecture: whether anyone h as a 
moral obligation to protect h is or her own information privacy, and if so, 
whether such an obligation ought to influence choice, policy, or the law. 
If people have an ethical obligation to protect their own privacy, there 
are more than merely prudential grounds for privacy v igilance. If a person 
has a moral obligation to protect her own privacy, then assuming moral 
obl igations creates prima facie reasons for acting, she would have a reason 
over and above prudent self-interest to adopt measures to safeguard 
important privacies. To protect informational privacy, ethical goodness 
might require that she, for e xample, not aim sexy pictures at minors or the 
general publ ic. Ethics might require that she secure financial information 
when transacting business online. Ethics might require that she keep u nder 
wraps whole-genome-sequencing data generated from cl inical care or 
research. She might even have an obligation to moderate free speech and 
the use of social media that w idely reveal her location, plans, activities, 
feelings, and beliefs. 
Of major significance, if people have an obl igation to protect their own 
privacy, there could be special "corporate responsibility" grounds for 
implementing meaningful and effective consumer privacy pol icies.30 We 
could praise firms who embrace s trong privacy-protection policies and 
adhere to codes of "fair information practices,"31 "generally accepted 
privacy principles,"32 or "privacy by des ign"33 -these measures facilitate 
27. Jennifer Preston, Weiner Confirms He Sent Private Messages to Girl, 17, N.Y. TIMES (June 
I 0, 20 II), http://www.nytimes.com/20 II/06/ l l /nyregionlweiner-says-he-sent-private-messages-to-girl-
17.htrnl. 
28. /d.; Ashley Parker & Michael Barbaro, In Reckless Fashion, Rapid Online Pursuits of 
Political Admirers, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/nyregionlweiners­
pattern-turning-political-admirers-into-on1ine-pursuits.html. 
29. Parker & Barbaro, supra note 28; see also Brian Stelter, Upending Anonymity, These Days the 
Web Unmasks Everyone, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
06/21/us/21 anonymity.html. 
30. Cf Anne Cheung & Rolf H. Weber, Internet Governance and the Responsibility of Internet 
Service Providers, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 403 (2008) (outlining the case for ISP responsibility for human 
rights and constitutional rights protections). 
31. Fair Information Practice Principles, fEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last modified Nov. 23, 2012). 
32. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. ACCOUNTANTS, INC. & CANADIAN INST. OF CHARTERED 
ACCOUNTANTS, GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRIVACY PRINCIPLES I, 13 (2009), http://www.aicpa.org/ 
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morally prescribed data management practices by individuals. (The analogy 
here is praising manufacturing firms for install ing safety devices on 
dangerous products like guns, automobiles, and c ircular saws to help 
consumers meet their obligation to use products safely.) 
The fact that Facebook.com (Facebook) offers ways for its globally 
popular social networking site to be used for restricted communications 
within intimate circles takes o n  ethical weight.34 Facebook makes it eas ier 
for users to comply with ethical duties by hosting less accessible secret 
pages than it would if it did not. While Facebook has greatly contributed to 
the culture of extreme self-revelation, I am suggesting that Facebook and 
other social media firms understand themselves as partners in our ethical 
goodness. The fact that compu ter rental companies extracted sensitive data 
from machines used by the ir customers35 has a two-fold unethical 
dimension. Not only did such firms malevolently engage in s pying,36 but 
they also undermined their unsuspecting customers' abilities responsibly to 
protect personal data from fal ling into the hands of u nwanted third parties. 
If people have an obligation to protect their own privacy, we might 
applaud publ ic laws and government entities that confer rights of 
anonymity,  restric t wiretapping, and limit access to stored 
communications. 37 Indeed, public law, rules, and judicial choices have 
implications for the ease with which persons can satisfy the moral duty I 
am probing. In 2012, a court in Minnesota found that a Facebook user had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy u nder the Fourth Amendment in her 
password-protected Facebook wall postings. 38 The federal distr ict court that 
made this finding honored the choice many make, whether for moral or 
interestareas!informationtechnology/resources/privacy/generallyacceptedprivacyprinciplesldownloadabl 
edocumentslgapp _bus_ %200909. pdf. 
33. ANN CAVOUIUAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES I (2011), 
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/0817foundationalprinciples.pdf. 
34. I am not suggesting that the policies are adequate, only that they are on the right track. 
35. FTC Halts Computer Spying, fEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www .ftc.gov/opa/20 12/09/designware.shtm. 
36. Anita L. Allen, The Virtuous Spy: Privacy as an Ethical Limit, 9 I MONIST 3, 3 (2008). 
37. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006), 
regulates access to communications and stored communications. The federal courts have found that 
there is a constitutionally protected interest in anonymous Internet use. See Anita L. Allen, First 
Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
885,925 nn.229-30 (2012) (citing Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712,717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Doc 
v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438-41 
(Md. 2009); Dendrite Int'l, Inc., v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760,765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); 
Deer Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Little, 938 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); In re Does 1-10, 242 
S.W.3d 805, 819-20 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)). 
38. R.S ex ref. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588(MJDIL1B), 2012 WL 
3870868, at *16-17 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012). The court held that a juvenile may proceed on a claim 
that her school violated her First and Fourth Amendment speech and privacy rights by punishing her 
based on what were intended to be limited access Facebook postings from a home computer related to 
her dislike of a school employee./d. at *9-13. 
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prudential reasons, to protect their own informational privacy. The court, 
like Facebook, functioned in the case as a partner in empowering Facebook 
users' moral compliance. 
Ill. THE CHALLENGE OF MORAL THEORY 
The complex question of whether and why privacy is an important 
ethical value is related to but distinct from the question of whether persons 
have a moral (or ethical) duty (or obligation) to protect their own privacy. 
Privacy could be a preeminent ethical good with widespread political and 
legal implications, and yet it still may be highly problematic to ascribe to 
individuals the ethical responsibility to protect their own privacy. 
First, the ascription may be problematic because the very concept of 
duties or obligations of self-regard is analytically incoherent. Or, second, 
there could be normative problems. For instance, there might be a plenitude 
of practical reasons for a person to try as hard as he or she can to protect his 
or her own informational privacy without it making good normative sense 
to ascribe to him or her an ethical duty to do the same thing. For example, 
we should all try hard to eat vegetables to promote our health, but surely 
there is no moral duty as such to eat vegetables! 
Let me suggest the schematic of an argument in favor of self-regarding 
information privacy duties. It goes like this. There are moral duties obliging 
moral agents to act in some ways rather than others. Moral duties include 
duties to others and duties to oneself. Among duties to self is a duty to 
protect one's own informational privacy. One ought to limit disclosures of 
information about oneself for utility reasons, pertaining to one's reputation 
and future opportunity; and/or virtue reasons, pertaining to modesty, 
reserve and temperance; and/or Kantian reasons, pertaining to dignity, self­
respect, autonomy, and freedom. In addition to "first-order" duties to 
protect one's own privacy, there may also be "second-order," derivative 
duties to protect one's own privacy for the sake of specific others or the 
community. My genome is also my siblings' genome, so I have an 
obligation to protect the privacy of my genome. My checking account 
number is also my husband's checking account number, so I have an 
obligation to protect the privacy of my checking account number. Among 
duties to others (family, friends, community) is a second-order duty to 
protect one's own informational privacy. 
The outlined argument starts with a distinction between duties to 
oneself and duties to others, and immediately therefore faces a challenge. 
The distinction embraces a controversial perspective whereby moral 
agents' moral obligations extend not only to the world but also to the moral 
2013 ]  An Ethical Duty to  Protect Information Privacy? 853 
agents themselves.39 Morality is in this sense both other-regarding and self­
regarding. Though I am not a pure Kantian deontologist- I do not rule out 
that the moral grounds for obligations can be consequentialist as well as 
non-consequentialist-I share with Kantians the controversial belief that 
moralists can ascribe coherently duties to--or at least duties regarding40-
the self. 
Kant derived both duties to oneself and duties to others from the 
categorical imperative to "[s]o act that you use humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means,"4I or alternatively-Kant advanced several 
formulations-to "act only in accordance with that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.'>'�2 For Kant a 
moral duty is "the necessity of an action from respect for [moral] law,'>'�3 
the categorical imperative. Only actions performed from a good will, from 
the motive of duty, have true "moral worth" in Kant's  special sense. Duties 
Kant recognized included the duty of honesty, the duty to preserve one' s  
life, and the duty ofbeneficence. 
Kant himself further divided duties to others and duties to self into 
"perfect" and "imperfect" duties.44 (He also distinguished between positive 
and negative duties.45) Kant described as "perfect" duties that are strict, 
narrow, and unremitting,46 such as the duty to tell the truth. He labeled 
"imperfect" the wide and meritorious duties, such as the duty of 
beneficence and the duty to develop one's  talents.47 
My views about moral duty are Kantian in flavor but are not views 
Immanuel Kant himself precisely held. On my understanding, duties to 
others are duties of care and respect. They are imperatives to act and omit 
in particular ways. Duties to others require that we not gratuitously cause 
bodily harm, that we keep our promises, and that we not degrade and 
39. LARA DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD: DUTIES TO ONESELF IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY 36 
(Robert Nozick ed., 200 1) [hereinafter DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD). 
40 . Henry Richardson suggested to me that certain philosophical problems can be avoided if we 
speak of duties "regarding the self' rather than duties "to the self." 
4!. IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 80 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1 996) (emphasis 
omitted). 
42 . Jd. at 73 (emphasis omitted). 
43. ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETI-!lCAL THOUGHT 43 (!999) (emphasis omitted). 
44. !d. at 44. 
45. DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD, supra note 39, at 36--43. 
46. !d. at 37, 43. 
4 7. !d. at 3 7. Both duties come from the same categorical principle, but their content differs since 
according to Kant we have no duty to perfect others or to promote our own happiness, but we do have a 
duty to promote others' happiness and perfect ourselves, which, to Jeske, seems backward. See Diane 
Jeske, Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 263 (1996) (defending the 
concept of duties to oneself). But see Keith Bustos, Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self 
and Others, 42 J. VALUE INQUIRY 2 41, 251-52 (200 8) (critiquing Jeske's elaboration of Kant). 
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deceive. Duties to oneself are duties of self-care and self-respect. Among 
such duties are, first, duties to act so as to promote one's rational interests 
in safety, security, freedom, and o pportuni ty and, second, duties to strive to 
be the kind of person who acts with self-regard, dignity, and integrity. It 
would potentially violate duties to the self of the first sort to, for example, 
make oneself ill through easily avoidable medical neglect and would 
violate duties of the second sort to waste the bulk of one's time on trivial or 
demeaning pursuits. 
The Kantian-flavored perspective I embrace with respect to duties to 
oneself is far from universal among moralist theorists. Indeed, many 
prominent philosophers flatly reject the notion that anyone has a duty to 
himself or to herself. The philosopher Marcus G. Singer rejected the idea as 
logically untenable.48 Kurt Baier called it "absurd," as Lara Denis has 
pointed out, while also pointing out that several other major philosophers­
Aristotle, F.H. Bradley, and Bernard Williams-did not mention the idea of 
duties to oneself at all. 49 
I take solace, however, in the fact that many philosophers do subscribe 
to the concept of duties to o neself and have mounted defenses. 50 But 
because there is disagreement and because I want to apply the concept to a 
new area of moral life and public policy, it seems appropriate that I should 
engage the philosophic debates to the extent it makes sense for a lawyer to 
do so , articulating reasons for embracing the notion of duties to oneself in 
the face of detractors. 
A. Is Morality Only Other-Regarding? 
The Kantian tradition notwithstanding, the idea that there are only or 
primarily duties to others has been described as an "axiom" of Anglo­
American Philosophy.51 On this idea, the e thics we embrace are presumed 
48. See e.g. Marcus G. Singer, On Duties to Oneself, 69 ETHICS 202, 202 (1959) [hereinafter 
Singer, On Duties to OneseljJ ("[I]t is actually impossible . . .  for there to be any duties to 
oneself. . . .  "); accord Marcus G. Singer, Duties and Duties to Oneself, 73 ETHICS 133, 142 (1963) 
[hereinafter Singer, Duties and Duties to OneseljJ. 
49. Lara Denis, Kant's Ethics and Duties to Oneself, 78 PAC. PHIL. Q. 321, 321 (1997) (citing 
KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS 215, 231 (1958}). 
50. See, e.g., LARA DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD, supra note 39, at 225-30 (elaborating on 
duties to self). See also Bustos, supra note 47; Paul D. Eisenberg, Duties to Oneself A New Defense 
Sketched, 20 REv. METAPHYSICS 602 (1967) [hereinafter Eisenberg, A New Defense] (arguing that self­
deception that leads to non-fulfillment of a moral duty can represent violating a duty one has to 
oneself); Daniel Kading, Are There Really "No Duties to Oneself"?, 70 ETHICS 155, 155 (1960); Mary 
Mothersill, Professor Wick on Duties to Oneself, 71 ETHICS 205, 205,208 (1961). 
51. Joan Straumanis, Duties to Oneself An Ethical Basis for Self-Liberation?, 15 J. Soc. PHIL. I 
(1984) (arguing that what look like women's duties to themselves are duties not to their families or 
themselves but to other similarly situated subordinated persons and their oppressors to pursue self­
enhancement). 
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social and other-regarding.52 It is wrong to injure other people, but when it 
comes to yourself, either (1) whatever goes, goes-sloth, willful ignorance, 
sexual degradation, drug abuse,53 even suicide--or (2) whatever goes, does 
not go to the extent that it violates the moral interests of others to whom 
you owe duties of care and respect.54 One's actions may be stupid, 
imprudent, unwise, self-defeating, and so on, but not morally wrong in the 
special sense as violative of any moral duties to oneself. 
Consistent with the denial of a robust set of non-derivative, first-order 
duties to oneself may be the postulation of derivative, second-order duties 
respecting oneself implied by first-order duties to others. We might think of 
parents as having second-order duties to take care of themselves so they 
can comply with first-order duties to take care of their children. Lifeguards 
at the beach may have a second-order duty to remain physically fit so that 
they are prepared for the toughest acts of first-order dutiful ocean rescue. 
Applied to privacy, in order for there to be second-order duties to protect 
one's own privacy as a duty of self-care and respect, we would need to 
identify a first-order duty whose performance it furthers. Perhaps I have a 
moral duty to protect my online data only because if I do not, secrets and 
sensitive data about my friends and family I am morally bound to protect 
would be disclosed to their detriment. 
B. Can Morality Be Self-Regarding? 
The view contrary to the axiom of moral philosophy that duties are 
other-regarding only is strongly associated with Kantian ethicists and 
interpretations of the writings of Immanuel Kant.55 As previously 
explained, Kant maintained that persons have duties to themselves.56 But 
the notion is far from clear-cut, since, as with many of Kant's most central 
ideas, "rather than shedding light on [the concept of duties to oneself, he] 
puts it under a cloud. "57 The allure and repulsion of the concept has led to a 
vast exegetical literature among Kantian scholars and moral philosophers. 58 
52. A "sub-axiom" of the view might be an anti-paternalism ethic and even libertarianism. 
53. Cf Paul Smith, Drugs, Morality and the Lmv, 19 J. APPLIED PHIL. 233, 238 (2002) (assessing 
whether there is a duty to oneself not to use illegal drugs like ecstasy, heroin, or cocaine that might 
ground legal paternalism or legal moralism in drug laws). 
54. !d. at 233. 
55. Cf Straumanis, supra note 51, at 5 (noting that it is "'easy to justif;" duties to self on Kantian 
premises). 
56. See generally DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD, supra note 39. 
57. Andrews Reath, Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself, in KANT'S METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS: INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS 349, 350 (Mark Timons ed., 2002). 
58. DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD, supra note 39; Eisenberg, A New Defense, supra note 50, at 
602; Paul D. Eisenberg, Duties to Oneself and the Concept of Morality, II INQUIRY 129, 129-33 
(1968); Jeske, supra note 47, at 263-64; George I. Mavrodes, Jan Narveson, & J.W. Meiland, Duties to 
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Policy and legal implications may attach to whether we think we can 
ascribe duties to oneself and hold people accountable for failure to perform 
them.59 
Kant famously argued that we ought to treat humanity, whether in our 
own persons or the person of others, always as an end in itself, never 
merely as means.60 As one commentator has put it: "[H]ow one treats 
oneself is as much a moral question as how one treats others."61 
Commentators have argued that Kant understood duties to self as logically 
and morally prior to duties to others, the sine qua non, the foundation of 
duties to others.62 
The self-regarding duties, like the other-regarding duties Kant ascribes, 
are not merely matters of utility, happiness, or prudence. They are matters 
of respect for the dignity of rational, autonomous human persons. Duties to 
oneself relate to the mandates of respect for our autonomy and rationality. 
These mandates include self-respect and entail a degree of self-esteem. For 
Kantians, our duties include the duty "constantly" to perfect our humanity 
and characters.63 
A Kantian argument from the idea of duties to self against using 
drugs64 might be that drug use undermines one' s  rationality and 
Oneself, 24 ANALYSIS 165, 165---Q7 (1964); Margaret Paton, A Reconsideration of Kant's Treatment of 
Duties to Oneself, 40 PHIL. Q. 222, 222-23 (1990); Nelson Potter, Duties to Oneself, Motivational 
lnternalism, and Self-Deception in Kant's Ethics, in KANT's METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: 
INTERPRETATIVE ESSAYS 371,371 (Mark Timmons ed., 2002); Reath, supra note 57; Rolf Sartorius, 
Utilitarianism. Rights, and Duties to Self, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 241, 24 7�8 ( 1985). 
59. Heike Baranzke, Does Beast Suffering Count for Kant: A Contextual Examination of Section 
17 in the Doctrine of Virtue, 5 EsSAYS PHIL. l, 3-5 (2004); Ruth F. Chadwick, The Marker for Bodily 
Parts: Kant and Duties to Oneself, 6 J. APPLIED PHIL. 129 (1989); Lara Denis, Animality and Agency: 
A Kantian Approach to A bortion, 76 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 117, 117 (2008); Lara Denis, 
Kant on the Wrongness of "Unnatural" Sex, 16 HIST. PHIL. Q. 225, 225-26 (1999); Susan Feldman, 
From Occupied Bodies to Pregnant Persons: How Kantian Ethics Should Treat Pregnancy and 
Abortion, in AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY K.ANTJAN SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 265, 265 (Jane Kneller & Sidney Ax inn eds., 1998); Thomas A. Mappes, What is Personal 
Ethics, and Should We be Teaching More of It?, II TEACHING PHIL. 33, 33-35 (1988); Debika Saha, 
"Duties to OneselF-A Reflection, 27 INDIAN PHIL. Q. 439, 441�3 (2000); Thomas Schranune, 
Should We Prevent Non-Therapeutic Mutilation and Extreme Body Modification?, 22 BIOETHICS 8, 11-
12 (2008); Smith, supra note 53, at 233; Charles Taliaferro, & Michel Le Gall, The Grear Escape, in 
CANNABIS: PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE: WHAT WERE WE JUST TALKJNG ABOUT? 77, 87-88 (Dale 
Jacquette ed., 20 10). 
60. KANT, supra note 4 I, at 79-8 I. 
61. Smith, supra note 53, at 238. 
62. DENIS, MORAL SELF-REGARD, supra note 39, at 188-94. 
63. James A. Gould, Kant's Critique of the Golden Rule, 57 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 115, I 15-17 
(1983) (interpreting Kant's analysis of duties to the self as set forth in his Critique of Practical Reason). 
64. See Samuel Freeman, Liberalism, lnalienabiliry. and Rights of Drug Use, in DRUGS AND THE 
LIMITS OF LIBERALISM: MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 110, 114 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 1999) (arguing that 
liberalism could exclude some conduct on grounds that it permanently destroyed the capacity for 
rational autonomy and distinguishing permanently from temporarily destroying such capacities). 
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autonomy.65 A Kantian argument from the idea of duties to self against 
publication of sensitive facts about oneself might be that it suggests a lack 
of self-respect or that it undermines freedom and autonomy by truncating 
future options or opportunities of the sort that foster autonomy and 
freedom. 
IV. REJECTING PRIVACY AS A DUTY TO SELF: TWO TACKS 
The claim that there are first-order, non-derivative privacy duties to 
ourselves might be rejected on the ground that ascribing privacy duties 
fundamentally misunderstands something about the nature of our privacy. 
Our privacy, the argument goes, is amenable to rights protection but not the 
protection of self-regarding duties. Other people must respect my privacy, 
and I must respect other people 's  privacy, but I don't have to respect my 
own privacy. For me, as to myself, privacy is optional. Now one might 
back up this argument from two vantage points. I will call them the 
conceptual and the libertarian. The conceptual tack denies, along the lines 
of philosopher Marcus G. Singer,66 that there are duties to oneself of any 
coherent kind, including duties to protect one's  own privacy. The 
libertarian tack portrays as moral injustice failing to treat the choices a 
person makes about her own life as her own acts of rational autonomous 
decision making, properly immune from moral mandate. 
A. The Conceptual Tack 
As commentators have pointed out, Kant himself recognized that the 
concept of duties to oneself generates a kind of contradiction or 
"antinomy." How can the binder be the bound?67 Some critics suggest that 
the idea of a duty to oneself is indeed contradictory and nonsensical 
because individuals can surely release themselves at will from any duties 
they owe only to themselves.68 Kant 's  resolution of the antinomy is, from 
the lawyer's perspective, obscure; his interpreters have been left to 
struggle. But some readers of Kant believe the notion of duties to oneself is 
indeed a self-contradiction. 
Marcus G. Singer argued that rights are claims that can be waived and 
that rights and duties are correlative.69 If D has a duty to P, then P has a 
right against D. But suppose D and P are identical. Now we say P has a 
65. Smith, supra note 53, at 238. 
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
67. Reath, supra note 57,  at 350-5 1 .  
68.  /d. at 35 1 .  
69. Singer, Duties and Duties to Oneself, supra note 48, at 1 4 1 .  
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duty to P. But to say that P h as a duty to P is also to say that P has a right 
against P, which amounts to P having a claim against P. But, Singer argued, 
it makes no sense to say that anyone has a claim against himself. And it 
makes even less sense to say that the rights against oneself can be waived 
at will, for that would make the idea of duties to ourselves silly and 
incoherent. Asks Singer: "What could it mean to have a right or a claim 
against oneself? (Could one sue oneself in a court of law for return of the 
money one owes oneself?)"70 
One way to maneuver around Singer's objection would be to postulate 
that the self is actually two ontologically distinct entities, a present and 
future self. When I owe a duty to myself, I am really owing a duty to the 
future person I will become-the one who stands to benefit from the good 
reputation, employment, friendships, credit and other advantages that flow 
from the present selfs willingness to limit her disclosures. The 
philosophical problems attendant to this move to bifurcate the self render it 
unattractive as the main response to Singer, if avoidable. So, I set it aside. 
Singer assumes without arguing that all moral rights are claims that can 
be waived and that are correlative to duties. Singer's critics have 
suggested,71 and I agree, that he conflated moral and legal conceptions of 
morality, ignoring aspects of the moral point of view that cannot be 
reduced to rights and claims.72 Moreover, it is by no means clear that all 
rights should be understood as claims that can be waived in the first place.73 
There is a second problem. Singer's position requires him to explain 
the common use of the expression, "I owe it to myself to do X." Why do 
we talk this way? Are we not presupposing duties to ourselves? The idea of 
duties to self is common and entrenched in whole genres of discourse. An 
example advanced by Joan Straumanis is the genre of fiction in which all­
suffering female characters set aside apparent duties to family in order to 
comply with felt duties to themselves.74 They set out to make a change, to 
"do something for themselves"-to behave in self-enhancing ways, such as 
seeking independence, education, a craft, a job, a career. 75 
Singer suggests that when we say, "we owe X to ourselves," we do not 
mean what we say. He suggests that such familiar statements are not literal, 
that what they really mean is that "I have a right to, am allowed to, and am 
70. Singer, On Duties to Oneself, supra note 48, at 202. 
7 1 .  Singer sought to answer his critics. Singer, Duties and Duties to Oneself, supra note 48. 
72. See Warner Wick, More About Duties to Oneself, 70 ETHICS ! 58 ( 1 960); Warner Wick, Still 
More About Duties to Oneself, 7 1  Ennes 213, 2 1 3  ( 1 96 1 )  (discussing that being a moral person means 
doing certain things and doing them for the right sorts of reasons and in the right sort of spirit). 
73. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS So PERVERSE 55 (20 1 1 )  (arguing that recognizing 
claims does not settle questions of waiver). 
74. Straumanis, supra note 5 1 ,  at I .  
75. !d. 
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determined to do X."76 Or they mean that "I think it would be imprudent or 
foolish not to do X."77 Because Singer interprets "duty to self' talk as 
pragmatic talk about self-interests, he claims the entire notion of duties to 
the self confuses morality with prudence. Figures of speech abound in 
language. But in the case of statements about duties to oneself, why 
suppose we do not mean exactly what we say? A moral theory should 
explain rather than discount inconvenient moral discourse. What needs 
explaining is the belief some moral agents have that, in addition to 
prudence and self-interest, they are ethically bound to act in a certain way 
with regard to their own lives. 
Singer offers a response to the objection that his view is inconsistent 
with the common notion that people have a duty to preserve their own lives 
and develop their own talents. He argues that such duties are not well 
understood as duties to oneself. 78 They are best understood as duties owed 
to others who suffer if we fail to live and flourish.79 They are, in effect, 
second-order duties to others that imply derivative responsibilities. A 
Kantian counterview invites us to see that each person's  flourishing matters 
and that each moral agent' s humanity has equal worth and merits moral 
regard. We are more than a tool for others ' flourishing. We are agents and 
beneficiaries of our own flourishing. 
Singer further argues that the recognition of vices and bad character 
traits in no way commits one to the notion of duties to oneself. The reason 
one should not be lazy or deceitful or a chain smoker is both that these 
habits and traits may be harmful to society and that they are not in one' s  
prudent self-interest.80 Quoting John Stuart Mill, "Self-regarding 
faults . . .  are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be 
carried, do not constitute wickedness."8 1  While bad habits and poor 
character do have prudential and other-regarding consequences, it does not 
follow that they do not have self-regarding moral consequences as well. 
Mill 's  words need to be understood in context. Mill 's  intent in 
distinguishing "wickedness" from "self-regarding faults" was to persuade 
readers accustomed to thinking that "wickedness" is an automatic ground 
for civilized Christian society to step in and take charge of people's lives 
instead to embrace the contingent utility of individual liberty. Once it is 
grasped that public regulation is not usually and necessarily the best (utility 
maximizing) response to self-regarding fault, there is no need to set self-
76. Singer, On Duties to Oneself, supra note 48, at 203. 
77. !d. 
78 .  !d. at  204. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. at 205. 
8 1 .  !d. 
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regarding faults outside bounds of  ethical discourse. Self-regarding faults 
may or may not amount to fai lure of individuals to do what utility 
demands. A utilitarian could consistently hold that the principle of utility 
obligates persons to act in certain ways with respect to others and in certain 
ways with respect to themselves, both in pursuit of the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. Toward justifying substantial control over our own 
l ives, Mill argues that the individual is usually the ideal arbiter of his own 
good because he is generally in the best position .to ascertain what will  
further his own good. This epistemological assumption is completely 
consistent with a uti l itarian interpretation of duties to oneself as duties to 
do, regarding one's  own life and interests, what the principle of utility 
demands. A person could be ascribed a duty to protect information about 
herself from disclosure for the sake of her own happiness, because her own 
happiness is part of the utilitarian calculus, too. 
B. The Libertarian Rejection 
Introducing John Stuart Mill brings me to a very different sort of 
reason one might have for rejecting privacy protection as a duty to oneself. 
Political theorists traditionally describe as libertarians those who take 
personal responsibility and the free choices of individuals to be of 
paramount importance to moral justice. The moral position I am about to 
outline understands privacy in  a libertarian fashion as a strongly, if not 
entirely, personal matter, as fol lows. There are moral duties. Moral duties 
include duties to others and may include duties to self. However, among 
duties to self there surely is no duty to protect one' s  own privacy. Given 
ideals of human freedom, privacy is not the sort of thing that could be 
obligatory. Privacy is purely personal. Privacy could be obligatory but is  
not because, in our (free) world, privacy is a take-it-or-leave-it 
condition/value, or in our (free, interdependent) world, publicity and 
disclosure are superior to privacy. If a person chooses to protect his or her 
privacy, that is fine and dandy. It is never morally wrong or unethical for 
an individual to choose privacy, other than where doing so violates 
someone else 's rights. By the same token, if a person chooses publication 
and sharing, living a transparent life in which he or she freely shares 
information about what he or she does, says, and thinks, that is nearly 
always fine and dandy too. It is not prima facie morally wrong or unethical 
to choose publicity over privacy. 
A libertarian might agree with Singer and maintain that duties to 
oneself do not make sense. Consistently, such a l ibertarian would claim that 
there is no duty to protect one's  own privacy. Yet, while denying a duty to 
protect one's own privacy (because of something about privacy), a 
libertarian might posit duties  to or duties regarding oneself of other sorts, 
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such as the sort egoists are famous for: prima facie duties to preserve one's  
life and aggressively to pursue one's  own interests. 
The libertarian finds the protection of privacy to be an unsuitable basis 
for the ascription of rights of self-care and self-respect. People don' t  have a 
duty to protect their privacy (whether or not they have other duties of self­
care or self-respect). Some other moral goods may be inalienable-life and 
basic liberty, for example. Privacy, though, is inherently a matter of choice. 
Accordingly, the libertarian continues, it would likely be wrong for persons 
or governments to unduly constrain or coerce the privacy choices of 
competent adult individuals. Public policy should be premised on the 
principals that government should protect privacy as it protects ordinary 
liberties and that individuals should be free to waive any such protections 
should they not wish them. 
Suppose a privacy libertarian were presented with the following 
realistic scenarios: ( 1 )  the thirty-five-year-old who publishes an opinion 
editorial in a mass-circulated newspaper critical of the administration' s  
economic policies and in  it reveals his good college grades, paltry current 
income, and the banks owed money for college loans and a condominium 
purchase, (2) the man or woman who discusses the details of an ugly 
divorce with any coworker who will listen, (3) the breast cancer patient 
who announces her diagnosis on a popular social networking vehicle and 
then, after a partial mastectomy, uploads "before and after" photographs of 
her affected breasts, and ( 4) the prominent man or woman who opts to have 
his whole genome sequenced and made public for use by researchers and 
encourages others to do the same. The privacy libertarian would say that 
none of the disclosures in these or similar cases involving educational, 
financial, sexual, interpersonal, or medical information amounts to an 
unethical or morally wrong act on the part of the discloser. The disclosures 
are personal choices that may involve risk, bad judgment, or bad taste but 
implicate no violations of any duties persons have to themselves (even if 
they may violate duties they have to others whose information is disclosed 
as an incident).82 
The conceptual and the libertarian rejection of privacy as a duty to or 
regarding ourselves is consistent with the recognition of p rudential grounds 
for safeguarding our own privacy so as to protect ourselves from the 
reputational, financial, or other harm that occurs when we live in the public 
eye or when our enemies or our well-meaning friends use otherwise secret 
information against us. In this vein, one could cite, as l have, a passage 
from the diary of John Adams. In 1 770, the patriot urged that we protect 
82. Disclosing my financial status also discloses my children's and spouse's financial statuses. 
Disclosing my marital problems also discloses my spouse's marital problems. Disclosing my genome 
also partly or wholly discloses my biological relatives' genomes. 
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ourselves from "damage, danger and confusion," and "loss, disgrace or 
mortification," by the policy of shielding "our sentiments, actions, desires, 
and resolutions."83 It is open to a privacy libertarian to insist that Adams 
was wrong or that he was right as a practical matter for the eighteenth 
century, not for the twenty-first. 
Perhaps I am overstating the strength of the libertarian threat. The 
moral case I would ultimately make for protecting my own privacy is not 
just about what I may owe myself, it is also about how my choices may 
harm others-the relevance of which no moral libertarian can ignore. 
Hence, a sufficient response to the libertarian might be to point out the 
negative externalities associated with individuals choosing to disregard 
their own privacy. Indeed, libertarians must recognize the possibility that 
recklessness and carelessness about one's  own privacy can have adverse 
consequences for others. I may have an obligation to safeguard my own 
privacy because, if I don't, I contribute to methods of business (e.g., 
persistently weak privacy policies) and lines of business (e.g. data mining) 
that seriously harm the interests of others. There are facts to excavate in 
mounting this response to privacy libertarians and concerns about public 
choice that I cannot delve into here.84 
C. "No Moral Duty " Perspectives 
As we can see from the foregoing discussion, there are several negative 
positions one might take respecting whether information privacy protection 
is a duty to oneself, including these: 
( 1 )  No moral duty to or regarding oneself There are no moral 
duties to oneself or regarding oneself, and therefore, no duty to 
protect one's own privacy. We may (or may not) have reasons 
of prudence and self-interest to protect our own privacy. 
(2) No moral privacy p rotection duty. There are moral duties to 
oneself, but they do not include a duty to protect one' s  own 
informational privacy. We may (or may not) have reasons of 
prudence and self-interest to protect our own privacy. 
(3) No first-order moral duty to or regarding oneself There are no 
first-order moral duties to oneself, and therefore no such duty 
to protect one's own privacy, but there are first-order duties to 
83. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY, supra note 3, at 1 95 .  
84. See Lior Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 201 3) (using median voter and other public choice analytics to describe the distributional 
effects of privacy Jaw). See also my response, Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and 
Nonnative Practice, 1 26 HARV. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 20 1 3). 
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others that may entail derivative second-order duties to protect 
one's  own privacy. 
(4) Prudence Only. We may have reasons of prudence and self­
interest to protect our own privacy, and commonly do. There 
are no moral duties to oneself, and therefore no duty to protect 
one's  own privacy. Nor is there any primary duty to others that 
entails a derivative duty to protect one's  own privacy. 
(5) No Reason to Protect. There are no general reasons of 
prudence and self-interest to protect one ' s  own privacy. There 
are no moral duties to oneself, and therefore no duty to protect 
one's  own privacy. Nor is there any primary duty to others that 
entails a derivative duty to protect one's own privacy. 
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I reject 1-5 above and subscribe to duties to oneself as an obligation to act 
in ways that protect one's welfare and promote self-respect. Moreover, I 
believe that among our duties to ourselves are duties of privacy protection. 
We ought-in the ethical sense-to protect our own privacy. I have not in 
this lecture exhausted the full analysis that ascriptions of privacy 
responsibilities require. I have, however, pointed the direction toward an 
expanded agenda of theorizing about the ethics of privacy in the 
information society's Age of Revelation. 
D. "Some Moral Duty " Perspectives 
Privacy is a requirement of our freedom, our dignity, and our good 
character. It is a foundational good, suitable for enshrining as a 
fundamental human right.85 In my view, people do indeed have a moral or 
ethical obligation to protect their own privacy (the same way they have a 
moral or ethical obligation not to lie, cheat, or steal) where privacy is 
understood as conditions of partial or complete observational and 
informational inaccessibility to others. Informational privacy requires 
limits on disclosure, l imits on access, and data security. Favoring privacy 
over publicity is not a matter of taste alone, like the choice between a white 
or blue breath mint. On the contrary, there will be situations in which it can 
be morally imperative to choose privacy and obligatory not to forgo 
pnvacy. 
85. E.g. , The Treaty of Lisbon of the European Union established data protection as a 
fundamental right. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, art. 2, Dec. 13 ,  2007, 2007 0.1. C 306/ 1 ,  at 52 ("Everyone has 
the right to the protection of personal data concerning them."). 
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When Congressman Weiner included suggestive pictures in a Twitter 
message sent to a virtual stranger met online,86 he violated his moral duty 
to himself to protect his own privacy as a matter of self-care and self­
respect. I also believe there are occasions when one is obligated to choose 
publicity about oneself over privacy. One may have an obligation to 
disclose one's  sexually transmitted infection to one's lovers out of other­
regarding care and respect. But information privacy appears to have the 
weighty status of a presumptive, essential, foundational moral good for 
persons, whereas publicity might not, at least not in a strictly analogous 
respect. (This is another philosophical question worthy of careful 
probing-is privacy or publicity the default value, or perhaps are they on 
equal prima facie footing?) 
We should make a habit and virtue of protecting our own privacy.87 
Duties to protect one's  own privacy can be articulated in admixtures of 
deontological, utilitarian, and aretaic frameworks, to name the most 
routinely discussed. The duty to protect one' s  own privacy is akin to a duty 
to promote the happiness, autonomy, and character of one ' s  current and 
future self. 88 (I note that Kant himself did not maintain that individuals 
have a duty to promote their own happiness, as I would.89) A modern 
deontological morality might understand privacies of modesty and reserve 
as modes of self-esteem, self-respect, or spirituality. An aretaic or 
perfectionist morality might treat a degree of modesty and reserve as 
favorable character traits conducive to the best life. Imagine a man with 
colon cancer who tells his coworkers in a limited distribution e-mail that he 
has colon cancer and is about to take some time off from work to begin 
treatment. Such a sensitive disclosure is not one that I would characterize 
as unethical. But now imagine that this same man e-mails, unsolicited, to 
his same . coworkers a detailed electronic diary about his cancer that 
includes photographs of his surgical wounds, MRis, and X rays, along with 
emotional accounts of his feeling before, during, and after months of 
chemotherapy, radiation, and recovery. Now we have "oversharing" that 
raises ethical concerns. Why? Because of the discomfort he causes others, 
but also, critically, for the damage to his own reputation, his loss of dignity, 
and his departure from good judgment and temperate character. 
86. Ashley Parker, Congressman. Sharp Voice on Twitter, Finds It Can Cut 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 30, 201 1 ), http://www.nytimes.com/20 1 1 /05/3 1 /nyregion/for-rep-anthony-weiner-twitter-has­
double-edge.htrnl. 
87.  ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY, supra note 3,  at  1 95 .  
88. See Jeske, supra note 47 (employing a Kant-inspired analysis of a duty to promote the 
perfection of others, a duty to promote the happiness of only our own intimates such as our friends and 
family members, and a duty to promote the happiness of our future selves). 
89. See id. at 265. 
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To provide another example of virtue-ethics grounds for keeping 
information about oneself private, in Unpopular Privacy I referred to a 
well-known passage from the book of Matthew in the Christian Bible 
commending secrecy concerning our acts of charity, prayers, and piety.90 
What would otherwise be pious virtue devolves into approval-seeking 
performance when flamboyantly disclosed to others. It seems to take 
something away from the good of what we do if we do it primarily in 
public spaces to score points with others. The culture of disclosure and self­
disclosure that recognizes no meaningful limit to showing off and 
exhibitionism is ethically flawed, whatever its practical rewards. And the 
limits prescribed may be moral limits on one' s  own conduct properly 
viewed as duties to self or second-order duties to self, implied by first-order 
duties to others. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Toward concluding, I should emphasize my intention to avoid two 
implications: the implication that people have a duty to do the impossible 
and the implication that personal responsibility for one ' s  own privacy 
precludes government and corporate responsibility for privacy protection. 
There are practical limits to how much people can do to protect their own 
privacy. Many of us are not sophisticated about the use of electronic 
technologies or the data gathering practices that are now commonplace. 
Some of us cannot avoid cultural and economic pressures to engage in 
transactions that result in information disclosures. As individuals we have 
limited ability to negotiate with cloud service providers, internet browser 
providers, telecommunications carriers, app developers, and the 
government over privacy-related "terms and conditions." Protecting our 
information privacy is hard. But we are not completely helpless. We can 
disclose less or differently. That said, nothing I am arguing here should be 
interpreted as letting Big Data or government or others off the hook. As I 
stated in my introduction, I am suggesting a new, richer way to think about 
the moral relationship of consumers to business and government-as 
partnerships in ethical goodness. 
If moral philosophers can tell lawyers and policy makers what we must 
and may do, we have to take on the very significant and tedious challenge 
of listening to what they say. Like many nonnative philosophical questions 
affecting public policy, when taken seriously, the question I have presented 
here is difficult to answer, and answers difficult to defend. 
90. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRJVACY, supra note 3, at 1 95-96. 
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A lot depends, in the first instance, on how one understands the 
concepts of privacy and moral or ethical goodness. But, definitional issues 
aside, it is clear that, with respect to a variety of contexts, points of view 
favoring privacy clash with points of view favoring publicity; and among 
the philosophical questions implicated by these perspectival differences is  
whether and when individuals may have a moral obligation to favor their 
own privacy over publicity about themselves, or, in the alternative, 
publicity about themselves over their own privacy. 
